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THE ROLE OF DEFINITIONS necessary and should be only as full
N a legal instrument a definition as necessary. It is difficult, and often
should be used only to explain risky, to try to formulate definitions
the meaning that a term is intended that describe the ways in which the
to carry. Although this advice might draftsman actually uses the defined
seem to be obviously sound, many terms elsewhere in the same instru-
draftsmen disregard it. ment. (It is apparently easier to use
The first thing to remember about words properly than to define them
definitions in legal instruments is accurately.) Draftsmen are prone to
that they should be used only when define a word in one sense and then,
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is drawn from the author's book, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL DRAFTING, a project of the American Bar Foundation, published by Little, Brown &
Company, Boston, Mass., 1965.
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without realizing it, use it in a very
different sense.
The main use of definitions in
legal instruments is, of course, to
achieve clarity and consistency with-
out burdensome repetition. Just as
every word in any legal instrument
ought to pay its own way, every
definition ought to be limited to
filling a real need. Fortunately, def-
initions "are seldom used in simple
private documents." CooK, LEGAL
DRAFTING 37 (1951).
KINDS OF DEFINITIONS
Real and Nominal
Some authorities divide defini-
tions into "real" and "nominal."
Because the former relate to the re-
finement and crystallization of con-
cepts rather than to the meanings
of words, many persons do not con-
sider them to be definitions at all.
ROBINSON, DEFINITION 7-11 (1954).
This discussion concerns for the
most part the latter, which do relate
to the meanings of words.
Lexical and Stipulative
Nominal definitions are called
"lexical" insofar as they assert a
meaning corresponding to actual
usage in the given speech commu-
nity. ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra, ch. 3.
They are called "stipulative" inso-
far as they declare a meaning differ-
ent from actual usage in that speech
community. ROBINSON, Op. cit. Su-
pra, ch. 4. Lexical definitions at-
tempt to record usage. Stipulative
definitions attempt to create it. Be-
cause they describe actual use-pat-
terns, the former have truth value.
The latter do not. ROBINSON, Op.
cit. supra at 35-39 and 62-66.
Classification by Method
Definitions may be usefully clas-
sified also in terms of their methods.
Whether lexical or stipulative, the
following kinds of definitions are
useful in legal instruments.
DEFINITION BY SYNONYM
The first, definition by synonym,
although infrequent, is occasionally
useful. A term is defined by equat-
ing it to a more familiar term whose
meaning is presumably sufficiently
clear to the audience to whom the
instrument is addressed. ROBINSON,
op. cit. supra at 94. For example:
"The term 'fracture' means break."
DEFINITION BY ANALYSIS
A second kind of definition is def-
inition by analysis. The draftsman
defines the subject in terms of a
parent class, a subclass, and the fea-
tures that distinguish the subclass
from others of the same parent class.
ROBINSON, op. cit. supra at 96. For
example: "The term 'cosmetic'
means an article intended to be ap-
plied to the human body to cleanse
or beautify it or change its appear-
ance." Such a definition must apply
to all the individual members in-
cluded in the subject and to noth-
ing else.
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DEFINITION BY SYNTHESIS
A third (and very similar) kind
of definition is definition by synthe-
sis. The draftsman defines the sub-
ject by its relation to something of
which it is a part. ROBINSON, Op.
cit. supra at 98. For example: "The
term 'carburetor' means a part of a
motor vehicle."
While the analytical definition
speaks in terms of parent class, sub-
class, and distinguishing character-
istics, the synthetic definition speaks
in terms only of parent class and
subclass. It is correspondingly less
informative. Both kinds are conno-
tative in that they define in terms of
significant characteristics. All three
methods presume that the described
meaning is exhaustive in the sense
that it purports to gi',. the full
sweep of the term (noiie of the
three is necessarily detailed). Be-
cause equivalence is assumed, the
word "is" may be substituted for the
normal connective "means."
DENOTATIVE DEFINITION
A fourth kind of definition useful
to lawyers is denotative definition,
that is, definition by listing all or
some of the things to which the
term refers. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra
at 108. Here, particular characteris-
tics are ignored. Such a definition
may be exhaustive (e.g., "The term
'narcotic drug' means opium, coca
leaves, cocaine, isopecaine, opiate, or
a salt, derivative, or preparation of
any of those products") or partial
(e.g., "The term 'narcotic drug' in-
cludes coca leaves"). Other kinds of
definitions, which are of interest
mainly to logicians and the philoso-
phers of language, need no consid-
eration here.
Making a Choice
What kind of definition should
the draftsman choose in a particular
case? Should he choose the method
of synonym, analysis, synthesis, or
denotation? If denotation, should
he make the definition exhaustive
or partial? The problem in each
case is the purely practical one of
selecting a method that is no more
complicated or elaborate than neces-
sary to deal with the relevant doubt
or uncertainty in the minds of his
audience.
If he is creating a new technical
term for a complicated idea, he will
probably choose a comparatively de-
tailed analytic definition. If the
problem is merely to put to rest sev-
eral specific doubts in the margin of
uncertainty surrounding a modestly
vague but generally adequate term,
he will probably choose a partially
denotative definition (e.g., "The
term 'income' includes [or does not
include] capital gain"). In each case
he tells his audience all that he
thinks it needs to know, but no
more. Definition for its own sake
has no place in legal instruments.
"FREEDOM OF STIPULATION"
For many years philosophers like
Mill and others have beat the drums
for what they call "freedom of stip-
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ulation." MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC
18 (8th ed. 1900). MacKaye has
stated this freedom succinctly as fol-
lows: "Any person is free to stipu-
late any meaning he pleases for a
word and his meaning shall always
be accepted." MAcKAYE, THE LOGIC
OF LANGUAGE 61 (1939). Although
MacKaye was not a lawyer, he
could not have stated more accu-
rately a principle that has been dear
to the heart of the traditional legal
draftsman.
The appeal of this position has
come from both a desire to have lan-
guage grow fruitfully and a rebel-
lion against the now generally re-
pudiated notion that words have
inherently proper meanings, that is,
that there is some natural affinity
between a word and the thing to
which it refers. The possible out-
come of this outmoded view is
found in the statement of the lady
who said to an astronomer: "I feel
such an admiration for you astron-
omers because of your many won-
derful discoveries about the uni-
verse. But the most wonderful of
all it seems to me is your discovery
of the names of the planets. How
for instance did you ever manage to
find out that the red planet named
Mars really is Mars?" MAcKAYE,
op. cit. supra at 95.
With the thorough repudiation of
this point of view, it has been easy
to go the whole hog in exercising
the freedom of stipulation. As early
as Plato's Cratylus, we find Her-
mogenes saying: "I . . . cannot con-
vince myself that there is any prin-
ciple of correctness in names other
than convention and agreement,-
any name which you give, in my
opinion, is the right one, and if you
change that and give another, the
new name is as correct as the old."
Page 174 (Jowett trans. 1892).
Ultimate Expression
This point of view found per-
haps its ultimate expression in the
famous exchange between Humpty
Dumpty and Alice in Lewis Car-
roll's THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLAsS
(ch. 6), which has been quoted so
often that it needs no repetition
here. What may surprise some,
however, is that the world of legal
draftsmanship has produced the
lawyer's counterpart of Humpty
Dumpty in a group of bills that
stated that for their purposes the
term "September 16, 1940," meant
"June 27, 1950"! E.g., H.R. 353, 474,
1624, 1882, 2335, 4171, 6391, 6757, 82d
Cong., and several other bills culmi-
nating in the enactment of the Vet-
erans' Readjustment Assistance Act
of 1952, 66 Stat. 663. This feat of
legal draftsmanship is not likely
to be equaled, let alone excelled, in
this century.
Less spectacular but more insidi-
ous is the instrument that says that,
for its purposes, the term "supplies"
includes, buildings. ["Seldom has
this gone farther than the English
statute which, it is said, provided:
'Whenever the word "cows" occurs
in this Act it shall be construed to
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include horses, mules, asses, sheep
and goats.'" COOPER, WRITING IN
LAW PRACTICE 7 (1963).] In a short,
isolated legal instrument this may
do little harm. But confusion is
certain in a long, complicated one
in which well accepted and clearly
delineated terms are twisted to ex-
tend or restrict its coverage. The
problem is even more acute when
an instrument must be read in rela-
tion to other instruments using dif-
ferent terminology. Here we have
the modern Tower of Babel.
Relationship of Convention
and Communication
Hermogenes, Humpty Dumpty,
and a long line of generally respec-
table legal draftsmen went wrong
in falsely assuming that, because
language is for the most part con-
ventional, its users have carte
blanche to attach whatever mean-
ings they like. What they failed to
grasp is the nature of convention
and its relation to effective com-
munication. Berenson has perhaps
best expressed for us the relation-
ship between convention and com-
munication. The fact that he was
talking about modern art makes his
comments no less apt.
Representation is a compromise
with chaos. . . .The compromise
prolonged becomes a convention....
The alphabet is a convention. So
is all arithmetical notation. So is
mathematics ....
...And the joy of creative art
comes when one is lured to hope
that he has found the cypher, the
symbol, the generic shape or scrawl,
the hieroglyph, the convention, in
short, that will do it ...
So long then as we want to have
. . . contact with others of our own
species, we can have it only through
conventions. If we shed any instinc-
tively or throw them over deliber-
ately, either they are replaced before
too long or we fall back into private
universes, self-immured incommu-
nicado ...
Literature, Anglo-American liter-
ature certainly, is now overshad-
owed by the glossolaly of Gertrude
Stein and still more by the polyglot
etymological puns and soap-bubbles
of James Joyce ...
It is worse in the visual arts.
Words drip with sub-meanings.
Take a word out of the colour-vat
in our own minds where it soaks;
do what you can to wring it clean,
to dry it, to harden it, to crystallize
it, as the French have done with
their language for three whole cen-
turies until the other day: yet some
trace of meaning, besides what is
intended, sticks ...
A tradition, a convention, needs
constant manipulation to vivify it,
to enlarge it, to keep it fresh and
supple, and capable of generating
problems and producing their solu-
tion. To keep a convention alive
and growing fruitfully requires
creative genius, and when that fails
it either becomes mannered and
academic or runs "amok." . . . SEE-
ING AND KNOwING 7, 9-13 (1953).
Why the link between language
and convention has a psychological
basis is suggested by Cherry's corn-
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ment that the fact that communica-
tion works at all "depends princi-
pally upon the vast store of habits
which we each one of us possess."
ON HUMAN COMMUNICATION 12
(1957). The key word here is
"habit," and anyone familiar with
Pavlov's dogs knows that the basis
of language convention is some-
thing akin to the conditioned re-
flex. This is not to say that meaning
is necessarily "behavioral." It says
merely that communication is based
on shared psychological habits and
that these habits are not easily or
quickly unlearned. Robinson
summed it up neatly when he said
that "it is not possible to cancel the
ingrained emotion of a word mere-
ly by an announcement." ROBINSON,
op. cit. supra at 77.
Lesson for Draftsman
The lawyer who defines "wheat"
as including rye is laying a trap not
only for his readers but also for
himself. Even a legislature is pow-
erless to repeal the psychological
law on which this is based. Like
ghosts returning to a haunted house,
established connotations return to
haunt the user who attempts to ban-
ish them. The draftsman who has
resorted to this slovenly device has
often forgotten his special definition
and reverted unconsciously to the
established sense, thus introducing
either an unintended result or an
intended result disguised as some-
thing else.
The temptation to use a Humpty
Dumpty definition is, of course,
strong. If a long and complicated
instrument makes many references
to wheat, and it becomes desirable
to extend the instrument to include
rye, it is far simpler to make a sin-
gle insertion in the definition sec-
tion ("The term 'wheat' includes
rye") than it is to insert the words
"and rye" after each appearance of
the word "wheat." At the same time
it would be hard to find a better
example of the penny-wise-pound-
foolish approach.
For these reasons it is important
for the legal draftsman not to de-
fine a word in a sense significantly
different from the way it is nor-
mally understood by the persons to
whom it is primarily addressed.
This is a fundamental principle of
communication, and it is one of the
shames of the legal profession that
draftsmen so flagrantly violate it.
Indeed, the principle is one of the
most important in the whole field
of legal drafting.
Nicknames and Fictions
This injunction, of course, does
not rule out the use of nicknames,
e.g., "the Great American Corpo-
ration (called 'the Corporation' in
this lease)," or appropriate fictions.
When a fiction is appropriate, the
draftsman should continue to use
his words in their normal senses
and label the fiction plainly by
using "as if" language.
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Do not say
The terms "child" and "issue"
include an adopted child.
Say
A child adopted by any person
shall be treated as if he were
a child of the blood.
But even before turning to fic-
tions such as this, the draftsman
should exhaust the possibilities of
amending each relevant provision to
make it say expressly what it is in-
tended to mean. More of his time
is required, but in the long run it
often saves the time of many more
readers and avoids unnecessary
confusion.
USES OF STIPULATIVE DEFINITION
AND LEXICAL DEFINITION
Lexical Definition
Though Humpty Dumptyism is
out, freedom of stipulation and stip-
ulative definition have legitimate
uses, which can best be understood
by examining the true purpose of
definitions in legal instruments,
Because a legal instrument is not
intended to supplant the dictionary,
one that hews as closely as possible
to accepted usage need not define
the great bulk of the terms that it
uses. Instead, it need define only
those terms for which accepted
usage in the given speech com-
munity is inadequate to carry the
intended message. A lexical defini-
tion is thus necessary only where a
partially established usage is still
gaining currency, competing usages
pose the threat of ambiguity, or a
critical element of established usage
is not sufficiently plain.
Stipulative Definitions
NEW CONCEPT
Stipulative definitions, on the
other hand, are necessary on two
general kinds of occasions. One is
when the instrument deals with a
new concept for which usage has
not yet established a name. Here
the draftsman may even have to cre-
ate a term. If he does, he is well
advised to choose one that puts no
greater strain on the reader than the
burden of facing the unfamiliar. He
should avoid a term whose estab-
lished connotations are sufficiently
similar to, and at variance with, the
intended meaning to create the
strong likelihood of confusion.
RESOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY
A second, and more often neces-
sary, use of stipulative definitions is
to resolve uncertainties in the cloudy
areas surrounding vague terms. A
full and more precise definition may
be substituted for the looser mean-
ing of accepted usage, in which case
it is partly lexical and partly stipula-
tive ("In this ordinance, 'mobile
home' means a vehicle or other port-
able structure more than 30 feet
long that is designed to be moved
on the highway and designed or
used as a dwelling").
Or a partial definition may be
used to resolve a specific marginal
uncertainty, in which case it is
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wholly stipulative (e.g., "In this Act,
'automobile' includes an amphib-
ious passenger motor vehicle"). In
neither case is the reader called on
to make a significant adjustment in
his normal response habits.
REAL DEFINITION
Much of the need for stipulative
definition grows out of what some
philosophers of language have called
"real definition," that is, the im-
provement and perfection of under-
lying concepts, rather than out of
the need to explain how a term is
being used. As Robinson has said,
To "analyse" a concept sometimes
means to improve it, that is, to sub-
stitute for it a very similar concept
which is superior. . . . Concepts are
improved, other things being equal,
when they are altered so as to fit
into a system, or into a better or
larger system. Thus the famous
definition of implication in Prin-
cipia Mathematica, "p implies q if
and only if either p is false or q is
true," while inconvenient in many
respects, had the great advantage of
building the notion of implication
into a large and detailed system of
ideas. ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra at
180, 184.
The perfection of legal concepts
is, of course, one of the principal
functions of the legal draftsman. It
took O.P.A. more than a year of
trial and error to perfect the concept
of "processor" for the purposes of
price control.
Naming of Concept
Once a concept is perfected, the
draftsman is faced with the prob-
lem of naming it. Whether to re-
tain the old name and add a stipula-
tive redefinition of it or to substi-
tute a new name' is the practical
problem of Humpty Dumptyism,
discussed above. If the center of
gravity of the concept has not been
substantially shifted, the former ap-
proach seems indicated. Robinson
has commented aptly: "Every im-
provement of a concept carries along
with it a stipulative redefinition of
the word expressing the concept."
ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra at 187.
On the other hand, if the new
concept could not be called by the
old name without forcing the reader
to make a substantial semantic re-
adjustment, the wiser course is to
find a different name. Whether
such a name requires a stipulative
definition of its own depends on
what that name suggests to the
mind of the ordinary reader in the
particular speech community.
Conclusion
This, then, is the proper scope of
stipulative definition. Indeed, if the
foregoing analysis is correct, the
competent draftsman has occasion
to define only sparingly. When he
does, most of his definitions are ap-
propriately stipulative in whole or
in part. Not often does he need a
purely lexical definition.
We see the legal draftsman oper-
ating on two planes. On the con-
ceptual plane, he is the selector or
sculptor of concepts appropriate to
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carrying out his client's purposes.
On the verbal plane, he is the selec-
tor or sculptor of words. The two
planes are as closely interrelated as
two adjoining layers of plywood.
FORMAL ASPECTS OF DEFINITIONS
Exhaustive or Partial
A legal definition should show
whether it is intended to be exhaus-
tive or partial. In the former case,
the draftsman should use the word
"means"; in the latter, the word
"includes." Although he should
never use the ambiguous expression
"means and includes," he may fol-
low an exhaustive definition in
which he uses the word "means"
with a supplementary partial one in
which he uses the word "includes."
Example:
In this agreement, "mobile home
park" means an area of land on
which two or more mobile homes
are regularly accommodated with or
without charge. It includes any
building or other structure, fixture,
or equipment that is used or in-
tended to be used in providing that
accommodation.
Comparable Equivalent
The word "means" is normally
followed by a comparable equiva-
lent to what precedes it. MARTIN,
THE LOGIC AND RHETORIC OF Expo-
SITION 32 (1958). Thus in the defi-
nition, " 'Settle' with respect to a
claim means consider, ascertain, ad-
just, and dispose of, whether by full
or partial allowance or by disallow-
ance," what follows the verb
"means" exactly equals what pre-
cedes it. If the defined word is a
verb, the explanatory equivalent
should carry the comparable verb
form. If it is a noun, the explana-
tory equivalent should carry the
noun form.
Sometimes it is not feasible to use
a comparable equivalent. In this
situation, the words "refers to" may
often be used.
Example:
In this lease, "settle" and "settle-
ment" refer to the consideration,
ascertainment, adjustment, determi-
nation, and disposition of a claim,
whether by full or partial allowance
or by disallowance.
Another contingency is illustrated
by the following example:
In this indenture:
(1) "Shall" is used in an imper-
ative sense.
(2) "May" is used in a permis-
sive sense.
Placement
Definitions should be placed
where they are the most easily
found. A term that is used only in
one section should be defined in
that section. A term that is used
only in one title should be defined
at the beginning of the title. A term
that is used throughout an instru-
ment should be defined at or near
the beginning of the instrument.
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KINDS OF DEFINITIONS To AVOID
In general, the draftsman should
avoid every definition that he does
not need. In particular, he should
avoid definitions of the kinds de-
scribed below.
* Definitions that recite the obvious.
Several years ago, the following sec-
tion appeared in the regulations of
the Atomic Energy Commission:
041 Form. A form is a piece of
paper containing blank spaces,
boxes, or lines for the entry of
dates, names, descriptive details or
other items.
What significant problems of state
this definition helped to solve would
be hard to imagine. Further com-
ment on the obvious and useless
seems unnecessary.
* Humpty Dumpty definitions. For
reasons already stated with some
vigor, Humpty Dumpty definitions
should be assiduously avoided. Al-
though a militant opposition to
such atrocities often attracts charges
of "fanatic" and "pedantic quib-
bler," the battle is worth the win-
ning for clarity of communication
and for clarity of thought.
* Degenerate definitions. A degen-
erate definition, according to Robin-
son, is one that "leaves us bereft of
any means of indicating an impor-
tant distinction that could be indi-
cated by the word in its previous
sense." ROBINSON, Op. cit. supra at
82. Redman further describes this
as "impoverishing the language by
using certain words in such a way
as to rob them of their special mean-
ings and make them do forced labor
as mere synonyms of other words."
The Saturday Review, March 2,
1957, p. 22.
Many lawyers have been guilty of
implying a degenerate definition
of the word "ambiguity" by using
it indiscriminately to cover both am-
biguity and vagueness. Dickerson,
The Diseases of Language, 1 HARV.
J. LEG. 5 (1964). Although "equivo-
cation" is available for taking its
place, the word is only infrequently
used in this legal context. As a re-
sult, it is difficult to discuss the con-
cept of ambiguity (in its classical
sense) with a lawyer. He is not
used to making the important dis-
tinction between ambiguity and
vagueness.
During the-recent recodification
of the military laws of the United
States, top-level officials in the Pen-
tagon made things unnecessarily
difficult for the codifiers and com-
plicated the art of communication
by insisting that the term "Depart-
ment," which is the traditional gov-
ernmental name for the headquar-
ters concept, be defined as covering
the entire military establishment,
which includes all field installa-
tions. 10 U.S.C. §101(5). The pur-
pose of this insistence was to estab-
lish the plenary powers of the Sec-
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retary of Defense over all elements
of the military establishment, a re-
sult that could have been easily
achieved without resorting to a de-
generate definition. This left the
headquarters concept bereft of its
normal label and required the codi-
fiers to improvise a substitute, some-
what cumbersome, term, "executive
part of the Department." 10 U.S.C.
§101(6).
It should take no extended argu-
ment to establish the undesirability
of definitions that tend to obscure
significant distinctions between un-
derlying concepts.
* One-shot definitions. Draftsmen
sometimes define a word in a legal
instrument and then use it only
once. Although this is not likely to
confuse, it introduces a circumlocu-
tion that wastes the draftsman's time
as well as the reader's. Here is a
recent example, slightly condensed:
Each judge shall be paid all nec-
essary traveling expenses and all rea-
sonable maintenance expenses while
attending court or transacting offi-
cial business at a place other than
his official station. The official sta-
tion of such judges for this purpose
shall be the District of Columbia.
What would be lost by restating
this provision as follows?
Each judge shall be paid all nec-
essary traveling expenses and all rea-
sonable maintenance expenses while
attending court, or transacting offi-
cial business, outside the District of
Columbia.
* Stufled definitions. Draftsmen
often abuse definitions by stuffing
them with substantive rules that it
would be more appropriate to state
elsewhere. An example appeared re-
cently in the Civil Air Regulations
of the Federal Aviation Agency:
A periodic inspection is an in-
spection of an aircraft required each
12 calendar months and is a com-
plete airworthiness inspection of
such aircraft and its various compo-
nents and systems in accordance
with procedures prescribed by the
Administrator. 14 C.F.R. §43.70
(rev. Jan. 1, 1962).
Such a provision should be di-
vided into a definition ("The term
'periodic inspection' means an in-
spection made at least once during
each 12-month period") and a sub-
stantive requirement ("Each peri-
odic inspection shall completely
cover the airworthiness of the air-
craft and its components and shall
be made in accordance with pro-
cedures prescribed by the Adminis-
trator").
A stuffed definition is sometimes
developed in connection with for-
mulas and computations. It takes
the form of a definition of a compli-
cated technical term, specially cre-
ated and usually without previous
connotations. The temptation here
is to make a complicated problem
seem simpler than it is. The effect
is heightened by putting the new
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definition with other definitions at
the beginning of the instrument.
This, unfortunately, not only does
not solve the basic problem but cre-
ates two additional difficulties, one
of arrangement and the other of
clarity. With an essential part of
the substantive rule placed else-
where, it is correspondingly harder
to fit together the two parts of an
integrated idea. Furthermore, it
may make the basic rule, taken by
itself, unclear or deceptively simple.
Even if the definition is placed
where the term is used, it is at best
circuitous, because the same result is
reached more directly by stating the
result intended or by simply refer-
ring to the related provision (e.g.,
"as computed under section 16").
A good working test of whether
a substantive rule and its accom-
panying definitions are adequately
stated is whether the reader can get
a generally accurate and complete
impression of the substantive rule
without referring to the pertinent
definitions. If he cannot, the chances
are that the draftsman has either
used words in unnatural senses or
put too much of the substantive
rule in the definition.
Stuffed definitions not only im-
pair clarity and good arrangement
but may produce unintended re-
sults. For example, a recently pro-
posed zoning ordinance included
the following definition:
"Parking space" means a space,
no smaller than 9 feet by 20 feet, for
the off-street parking of one motor
vehicle.
This definition looked innocent
enough until the reader examined
some of the basic provisions. For
example, one provision of the pro-
posed ordinance forbade the loca-
tion of parking spaces in front yards
in some residential or business dis-
tricts. Under this definition, an
owner might have safely located a
9-by-19-foot parking space in his
front yard, because, not being with-
in the definition of "parking space,"
it would have fallen outside the pro-
hibition. On redraft, the definition
("The term 'parking space' means
a space for the off-street parking of
one motor vehicle") was stated sep-
arately from the substantive require-
ment ("No parking space may be
less than 9 feet by 20 feet"). Stuffed
definitions, therefore, are not only
inartistic but dangerous.
CONCLUSION
Although, by itself, the problem
of definitions may seem to some to
be relatively unimportant, the so-
phisticated draftsman knows that
systematic adherence to the prin-
ciples of communication and inter-
nal organization as performed in a
myriad of small operations pays
rich cumulative rewards in substan-
tive coherence and readability. The
draftsman who is sensitive to the
uses and pitfalls of definitions is
likely to be sensitive to the other
factors upon which sound drafts-
manship ultimately depends.
